We might think that except for scientists, Antarctica is basically of no interest to mankind. But this is not the case: human activities on the continent have been governed by a treaty since 1961, and since then a treaty system has been established for the continent, which includes a number of agreements. This treaty system has been successful in keeping geopolitical tensions away from Antarctica during and after the Cold War, and in preventing the militarisation of the continent. Today, however, China and Russia are pushing the boundaries of the treaty system on which for a long time there was a consensus, which fits in with the general attitude of both countries towards Western rule systems. It cannot be ruled out that the result of this process will be the erosion of the treaty system for Antarctica.
The Antarctic Treaty System
Antarctica was discovered in the 19th century, and during the 19th and 20th centuries, seven countries made territorial claims to the continent: Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom. In the 1940s and 1950s, territorial claims were a source of international conflict, as countries with overlapping territorial claims disagreed with each other and states that did not have territorial claims refused to recognise the claims of others.
The Antarctic Treaty, which governs the activities of states in Antarctica, finally put an end to the disputes. The treaty was signed in Washington on 1 December 1959 by the twelve countries (including the seven mentioned above) whose scientists had been working in and around Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year in 1957-1958. The treaty entered into force in 1961 and since then many countries have joined. The number of parties is currently 57.
The treaty deals with disputes over territorial claims by neither approving nor rejecting the claims, but rather, as it were, setting them aside. Under the treaty, two states, the United States and Russia, reserve the right to make territorial claims (although neither has exercised this right so far), but no other state may make territorial claims, and the territories of the seven states with claims cannot be increased. Since the treaty did not force any state to give up its own claims or accept those of others, the states were willing to put aside their differences. As a result, researchers from different countries can work across the continent, regardless of “frozen” territorial claims. Currently, 29 countries (including several Central and Eastern European states: Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine) have around 100 research stations in Antarctica.
Under the treaty, Antarctica is to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, research results from Antarctica must be made available to others, and the entire continent (including stations and equipment) can be inspected by member states at any time to ensure compliance with the treaty. Over time, the Antarctic Treaty has been supplemented by other agreements that elaborate on the provisions of the treaty, such as the 1991 Madrid Protocol, which prohibits mining and other forms of resource extraction except as part of scientific research. The set of agreements that cover Antarctica is called the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).
States around the North Pole. Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
A comparison between the Arctic and Antarctica may be raised, as they are geographically and climatically similar places. Politically, however, the differences are significant: while the Arctic, which is a water area, is not covered by an international treaty, Antarctica, which is a continent, is. Arctic matters fall under the jurisdiction of the intergovernmental Arctic Council, whose operations were blocked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 because other member states refused to participate in its work under the Russian presidency. In the case of Antarctica, there has been no such turbulence in the decades of the ATS’s existence, partly due to the different regulatory regime, but also as a measure of the ATS’s success.
China and Russia’s ambitions
The Antarctic Treaty was created to keep Cold War geopolitical tensions away from Antarctica and to prevent the continent from being used for military purposes. The treaty and its related conventions successfully fulfilled their function and maintained the status quo after the Cold War too, but the treaty system has recently been confronted by new challenges that push its limits. This is essentially because China’s and, to a lesser extent, Russia’s increasingly obvious strategic objectives for Antarctica (in relation to fisheries, mineral extraction and the potential militarisation of the continent) are incompatible with the ATS.
Fisheries
One of the areas concerned is fishing, where China and Russia, under the guise of permitted scientific activity, are in fact strengthening their own positions by mapping the continent’s resources in order to be in a better position to potentially exploit them later. Large shoals of krill and fish are found off the coast of Antarctica. Parts of the continent’s waters are protected marine areas, but China has in recent years deployed fleets of trawlers in these waters under the banner of scientific activity. Since 2017, China and Russia have repeatedly blocked the creation of further protected areas and other conservation measures. The two countries appear to be exercising their veto power due to Antarctic krill fishing: at the end of 2022, four Chinese krill fishing vessels were active in Antarctic waters, with another four under construction. While Russia has not fished in the Southern Ocean since 2010, it announced in early 2022 that it would invest the equivalent of some $600 million in krill fishing, including the construction of five trawlers. Beijing has called for “further scientific research” to determine the need for new marine protected areas, but under this guise it would, in fact, most likely fish in the waters concerned. Other countries, such as Norway, Chile, Australia, France, Japan, South Korea and Spain, also fish in Antarctic waters, but only China and Russia do not support the creation of new protected areas. France – along with Australia, New Zealand, the UK and the US – has been pushing for the creation of three marine protected areas since 2012, which Beijing and Moscow oppose, interpreting these efforts as an attempt to limit the ability of other states to establish a greater presence in Antarctica.
The potential militarisation of Antarctica
Antarctica plays a central role in global communications, as stations in the Antarctic are vital for the operation of satellites. The continent can also be a militarily valuable area, so there is a risk that the scientific presence of some countries could be transformed into a military presence. Although the Antarctic Treaty prohibits the militarisation of the continent, the presence of troops and military equipment is allowed if it supports scientific research. Many countries use their military forces for activities in Antarctica, including Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, China and Russia. However, it is difficult to determine whether a country’s personnel in Antarctica are conducting civilian or military operations. Satellites are a case in point: America’s GPS, China’s BeiDou, Europe’s Galileo and Russia’s GLONASS navigation systems all rely on Antarctic ground-based receivers for their operations. Although these systems are central to scientific research in Antarctica, they clearly have military applications too.
Both China and Russia have included Antarctica in their national security strategies, which raises doubts about the future of the continent’s peaceful use. China’s Antarctic activities are of particular concern to many Western observers, especially because Chinese law requires that any civilian research activity must also have military applications or utility for China. In light of this, it cannot be ruled out – as for example the Australian Signals Directorate, one of Australia’s national security organisations, has stated – that Chinese research stations may host military (e.g. surveillance) activities. This is supported by the fact that the 2020 publication of the PLA Academy of Military Science, The Science of Military Strategy, also discusses the military use of the polar regions. In addition, according to Australian intelligence, Chinese military personnel have been involved in China’s Antarctic program without reporting their presence, in violation of the Antarctic Treaty.
In its 2022 report on Chinese military and security developments, the US Department of Defense states that China’s “strategy for Antarctica includes the use of dual-use technologies, facilities and scientific research, which are likely to be at least partially directed at improving the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army”. According to some US and Australian opinions, the newest Chinese Antarctic base, which was opened earlier this year, could also be used to monitor Australian and New Zealand communications (these two countries are, not incidentally, allies of the US). However, Antarctica’s remoteness and extreme weather conditions make it a less than optimal location for military surveillance activities – at least with current technologies.
Broader strategic objectives
Russia, which has six Antarctic research stations (four permanent and two seasonal), believes that it has been eclipsed by Western countries in the region, especially in recent years. To counter this, Moscow has been trying to increase its presence in Antarctica in recent years, including partial modernisation of its stations, fish stock surveys and mineral exploration drilling (which is prohibited by the ATS). China opened its fifth research station in Antarctica this spring – which, incidentally, it built without submitting the necessary environmental assessments to the members of the Antarctic Treaty. The Asian country’s Arctic ambitions are illustrated by the fact that it currently has four icebreakers, while the US, which has three Antarctic bases, has two aging icebreakers and Australia, which has the largest territorial claim in Antarctica, has one (which has refuelling problems). China is also preparing to build its first permanent Antarctic airstrip this year, which will greatly facilitate the transport of people and cargo.
Antarctica has significant deposits of oil, natural gas, gold, coal, iron ore, copper, zinc, nickel and lead. Both China and Russia have expressed an interest in relaxing the Madrid Protocol to allow greater exploitation of resources. Mineral exploitation therefore appears to be a long-term goal of the two countries’ Antarctic strategy. Moreover, China intends to increase its global importance through an active presence in Antarctica, as demonstrated, among other things, by the construction of research stations, and its overall strategic goal is probably to strengthen its presence on the continent in order to gain greater influence on Antarctica and thus be in a better position when the Antarctic Treaty is potentially renegotiated. Russia’s Antarctic strategy probably serves the same purpose, but Moscow has limited financial means to strengthen its presence, for example to sufficiently upgrade its research stations.
Pushing the boundaries openly
There are also quite open examples of pushing the boundaries of the ATS. For example, there have been cases of Russian fishing vessels falsifying their position in the Southern Ocean in an attempt to conceal their illegal fishing activities in protected waters. In 2019, China attempted to take control of the highest point in Antarctica, Dome Argus, an ideal place to operate satellites. Beijing proposed the creation of a specially managed zone here, a zone allowed by the ATS to which a country can restrict access. However, such a zone can only be created if the country can demonstrate that future research activities in the same area would undermine its research programme. Beijing argued that this was the case, but given that China was in fact the only country conducting research in the area at the time, its request was rejected.
In a surprising development last September, the commander of the Iranian navy declared that Iran had “rights” to territory in the South Pole and that it planned to conduct military and scientific activities on the continent. The commander said Antarctica was “the best place for ballistic missile control” from a military point of view. Regardless of whether Iran’s plans materialize, this development is in rather open defiance of the Antarctic Treaty, which prohibits both the military use of the continent and the assertion of territorial claims.
Lack of punitive mechanisms
How is it possible to breach the ATS covertly or even openly? The problem is that there are no enforcement mechanisms to deter or punish activities that contravene the ATS. This is the purpose of the convention on international inspections, but it contains many loopholes. These allow states to circumvent the controls required, under which Antarctic Treaty parties are obliged to provide access to their research stations and vessels for inspection. For example, Russia has made its station runways inaccessible and turned off station radios to prevent teams arriving to carry out inspections from landing. The Antarctic system is basically built on trust, which in turn creates opportunities for abuse.
One solution could be a review conference for the Antarctic Treaty, which could decide to create the missing mechanisms. However, to convene such a conference would require unanimity among the 29 voting members, which is highly unlikely given the current global political realities. By the way, the possibility of convening a review conference to amend the treaty has been available since 1991, but has never been used.
However, the Madrid Protocol is open to revision from 2048 onwards, and China and Russia will most likely try to renegotiate the Protocol to exploit the resources of the Antarctic. However, the ATS is already eroding, so there could be major changes in Antarctica before 2048. While the boundaries of the ATS are being tested by China and Russia, other countries, fearing to be at a disadvantage, may take steps that also weaken the treaty regime, which could set in motion an escalating process that could ultimately render the ATS irrelevant. This could happen, for example, as a result of space power rivalry. China sees space as an area of future great power competition in which the polar regions play a strategic role, and it is therefore possible that Beijing will eventually build the infrastructure necessary for a presence in space in Antarctica, including the stationing of troops. Of course, China is not the only country that may try to use the Antarctic in this way, but whichever country decides to do so first, it may be followed by similar moves by other powers.
Summary
New technologies, increased competition between major powers and a changing world order are leading to processes that are challenging the Antarctic Treaty System and the decades-old consensus on Antarctica, and could lead to the erosion of the treaty regime. The ATS was established in an era of very different political and technological conditions and the regulation of Antarctic activities is proving inadequate in today’s circumstances. In the absence of real enforcement mechanisms and restrictions, states can engage in activities in Antarctica that are contrary to the treaty regime without any meaningful consequences. This situation is being exploited by China and, to a lesser extent given the scarcer resources available to it, Russia.
In the decades to come, the political dynamics of Antarctica are likely to mirror, and to some extent even influence, great power competition in other parts of the world. China and Russia are likely to increasingly seek to exploit weaknesses in the Antarctic governance mechanism. An expanded definition of what constitutes scientific, research and peaceful activities, as well as increased use of dual-use technologies, may increasingly serve selfish interests that are not in harmony with the ATS.
The fact that China and Russia are pushing the limits of the Antarctic Treaty System fits into a global trend of these two countries rejecting the rules of the Western world order and trying to create their own set of rules instead. In the absence of meaningful enforcement mechanisms in the ATS, there is a chance that the West will fail to constrain these efforts and the treaty regime will gradually erode. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that, in the light of Chinese and Russian expansion, the Western powers present in Antarctica, not wanting to be left behind, will also start to ignore the rules and contribute to this process.
