The introduction of the euro was the topic of the latest English-language event of the Oeconomus Economic Club, titled “Preparing for the Euro: Readiness and Timelines,” held on May 28, 2026. Experts shared their opinions on the issue—which has once again returned to the agenda with the formation of the new government—and then confronted their arguments under Chatham House rules. They largely agreed that the introduction of the euro enjoys broad public support and undoubtedly comes with advantages, but they also warned that it is important to prepare the Hungarian economy properly for it, and that setting a target date is far from simple.
“Public debate is taking place in Hungary about the introduction of the euro and whether it would be good or bad for our country. Therefore, the Oeconomus Economic Research Foundation also provides a forum for such debates, and in the future it will continue to serve as a venue for discussing policy issues that clearly have an impact on Hungary,” emphasized Péter Törcsi, President of the Oeconomus Economic Research Foundation, in his welcoming speech.
A Strategic Decision
In his opening presentation, Barnabás Virág, Chief Advisor to the Governor of the Hungarian National Bank and Chairman of the Budapest Stock Exchange, emphasized that introducing the euro is a strategic decision.
“We need a well-planned and well-executed strategy for the successful introduction of the euro. Instead of speed, we should focus on restarting our convergence path and on long-term sustainability. Hungarian society supports the euro: according to a recent Eurobarometer survey, 67 percent of the population supports its introduction, while the average support rate in countries outside the eurozone was 44 percent,” he pointed out regarding the social aspect.
At the same time, only 21 percent answered yes to the question: “Do you think Hungary is well prepared for the euro?”
Barnabás Virág explained that over the past decades the Hungarian National Bank has prepared several analyses on the costs and benefits of introducing the euro. One of the main conclusions of a 2001 analysis was that the Hungarian economy could benefit from the euro in the long run, and it identified three main advantages:
- lower transaction costs,
- deeper integration into the European economy and global value chains,
- and the possibility for the economy to operate with lower yields.
Another study from 2020 concluded that, in light of the crises of the previous decade, fulfilling the Maastricht criteria alone is not sufficient for successful accession. A new set of criteria is needed to assess preparedness for introducing the euro, and greater emphasis must be placed on real convergence.
“The experiences of Europe’s peripheral economies regarding the introduction of the euro are mixed,” he emphasized. According to Barnabás Virág, some countries, such as the Baltic states, and to a lesser extent Slovakia and Slovenia, were able to maintain economic convergence after introducing the euro, while others—such as Finland, Italy, Spain, and Greece—were not. The reason is naturally not the euro itself; other factors, such as active fiscal policy and the lack of competitiveness reforms, played an important role.
“Overall, however, the data show that the euro in itself is not a miracle cure. The decisive factor is the quality of economic policy,” he warned.
He also recalled that numerous indicators show whether a country is ready for the euro. One such indicator is the level of foreign trade integration or the synchronization of economic cycles. According to these indicators, Hungary is already very strongly integrated into the eurozone.
“We meet the criteria of an optimal currency area. Moreover, the 2020s have significantly changed the cost-benefit balance as well. Governments and companies increasingly need to make new investments in many areas, where the cost of financing is a decisive factor. Meanwhile, new financial innovations are continuously emerging that strengthen demand for major global currencies. New investment platforms, passive investment strategies, central bank digital currencies, and the emergence of stablecoins all increase the risk of euroization,” Barnabás Virág warned.
He explained that over the past two years, one-third of domestic savings have moved into foreign-currency-denominated assets. Overall, new financial innovations will increase the attractiveness of developed currencies, while preserving stability or adequately developing payment systems will become increasingly costly for smaller emerging markets such as the forint market.
“We must be aware that both the potential benefits and the possible risks of introducing the euro are greater than they were during the past two decades,” Barnabás Virág concluded his presentation.
According to his conclusion, four factors make the introduction extremely challenging:
- the weak structural starting position of the Hungarian economy (for example, Hungary’s budget deficit may be around 7 percent this year),
- the eurozone itself is in a more difficult economic situation than at any time during the past 25 years. The region is under pressure from several directions (for example, strong Chinese industrial competition, American tariffs, and more expensive raw material sources),
- the global environment in the 2020s has once again become more inflationary,
- and new fiscal requirements and rules have appeared (for example, increased defense spending).
He believed that successful euro adoption requires a well-coordinated strategy in three areas:
(1) an open public dialogue must be conducted about the advantages and possible risks,
(2) coordinated strategic cooperation among the branches of economic policy is necessary (fiscal and monetary policies, geopolitics, as well as wage and structural policies),
and
(3) appropriate countercyclical fiscal and regulatory reserves must be built up.
Legal and Political Considerations
János Bóka, Member of Parliament, Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on European Affairs, and former Minister for European Union Affairs, analyzed the topic from legal and political perspectives.
He believed that by joining the European Union, Hungary undertook a general legal obligation to introduce the euro. He recalled that there is no specific deadline for introduction, and currently there is no external political or legal pressure to introduce the euro as soon as possible.
“The Fundamental Law states that the forint is Hungary’s national currency. Consequently, introducing the euro requires broad political consensus and a constitutional majority, but thanks to the current Hungarian electoral system this does not represent a real obstacle, since there has always been a two-thirds government majority,” he explained.
Regarding political questions, János Bóka pointed out that at the European level the future of the euro is currently not a pressing issue, because the EU is struggling with much more acute structural challenges. At the level of European party politics, a certain degree of division still exists between sovereigntists and others regarding the euro, but not to the same extent as before (for example, the French National Rally has made peace with the euro).
At the national level, neither the patriotically neutral Czech government nor the strongly pro-European Polish government is particularly enthusiastic about introducing the euro in the near future.
He pointed out that Hungary’s situation is somewhat different: Hungarian public opinion clearly supports the euro because it sees it as a symbol of European prosperity. The public knows little about the European Union, but everything connected to it appears positive to them, and this also extends to the euro: for Hungarians it embodies stability and prosperity.
Hungarians do not expect the euro to be introduced as quickly as possible, but they do expect systematic work to be done toward its introduction.
“The general political debate about introducing the euro has more or less concluded without ever truly beginning,” the former minister said.
“The debate is actually about what should be done and how in order to achieve introduction. This is a legitimate debate, but it is not identical to comparing the costs and benefits associated with introducing the euro. However, it is not impossible that a real political debate will emerge once the first governmental proposals regarding euro introduction become known,” he emphasized.
János Bóka believed it would be useful and important to discuss whether 2030 should be the target date.
From Opponent to Supporter
Attila Szalay-Berzeviczy, former Chairman of the Budapest Stock Exchange, opened his presentation with the confession that in 2011 he strongly opposed introducing the euro because the eurozone crisis had demonstrated that the common currency had significant systemic problems that could place weakly competitive countries in a severe situation during a major crisis.
According to him, the euro’s main problem is that behind the monetary union there is no common fiscal policy system. However, since then the EU and the European Central Bank have implemented many important safety measures after learning from the Greek debt crisis, and therefore today Szalay-Berzeviczy supports the introduction of the euro in Hungary despite the remaining risks.
As he explained, his opinion changed partly because during the two major crises of the past six years—the Covid crisis and the war in Ukraine—the euro remained stable and none of its member states got into trouble, whereas the same could not be said about the forint and Hungary.
According to Attila Szalay-Berzeviczy, it is true that in everyday life an independent monetary policy will be missed in the fight against inflation, but during major economic and financial crises the forint always multiplies the negative effects on Hungary, because in such situations the central bank routinely has to raise interest rates in defense of the domestic currency precisely when recession would justify monetary easing.
Szalay-Berzeviczy emphasized that beyond fulfilling the Maastricht criteria, Hungary must prepare for euro adoption in terms of productivity and competitiveness.
“However, these latter two factors cannot serve as excuses for delaying the introduction of the euro until productivity and competitiveness in Hungary reach the Western European average, because we will never achieve that on our own—only after introducing the euro, under pressure,” he explained.
He believed that for such a small and open economy, where export activity accounts for more than 70 percent of GDP while more than 70 percent of total exports go to the EU, maintaining the forint is not worthwhile.
He also addressed the 2009 Greek debt crisis, disputing the widespread belief that hosting the 2004 Olympic Games pushed the Greek economy into recession.
In his opinion, the Olympic Games actually functioned as an anti-cyclical economic measure that kept the Greek economy on a growth path during the global crisis following the bursting of the Nasdaq bubble in 2000 and the 2001 WTC terrorist attacks.
According to him, without the Olympics the Greeks would already have collapsed economically around the turn of the millennium.
He argued that the Greek crisis had many causes, including low tax morale, an enormously bloated public administration and welfare system, excessive military spending, and the premature introduction of the euro, which dealt a blow to the already weak Greek economy struggling with structural problems and poor competitiveness indicators.
Competing Priorities
In his presentation, economist and associate professor Zoltán Pogátsa outlined the contradiction between two goals set by the Hungarian government: introducing the euro around 2032 and carrying out major developments across numerous sectors.
As he said, he fears many people underestimate the contradiction between these two goals, which cannot both be achieved simultaneously.
He pointed out that the debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 75 percent, while the criterion for euro adoption is 60 percent, although the EU may be somewhat lenient if the country is moving in the right direction, potentially accepting 65 percent.
“Nevertheless, reducing Hungary’s debt ratio from 75 to 65 percent would still be an extremely difficult task,” he warned.
Pogátsa highlighted several areas where enormous development needs exist.
“The biggest question is Paks II, which costs 9,000 billion forints and currently amounts to nothing more than a trench filled with concrete. Should we continue the project?”
However, both continuing and halting the project would be expensive.
“The Hungarian State Railways (MÁV) are in such terrible condition that approximately 6,000 billion forints would be needed just to bring them to a functioning—not Western European—level. Secondary Hungarian roads are also in dreadful condition, and huge investments would be required to raise them to a general Eastern European standard. Healthcare would need an additional 3–4 percent of GDP. The housing stock, water infrastructure, and pensions would also require massive investments,” he listed among the challenges.
He believed it is impossible to simultaneously carry out these gigantic expenditures while also reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio.
“The revenues promised by Tisza—for example from eliminating corruption in public procurement and from wealth taxes—will be nowhere near sufficient: at most they may amount to a few hundred billion forints, while several thousand billion would be necessary,” he added.
The economist emphasized that Hungary’s debt burden is not actually high. The average debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU is 81 percent, while Hungary’s is 75 percent.
However, the average debt-service ratio in the EU is 1.8 percent of GDP, whereas in Hungary it is 5 percent, which is exceptionally high within the EU.
“This is not because our debt is enormous, but because the previous government governed so poorly that nobody trusted it, and therefore we pay a risk premium. There is strong confidence in the new government, which is also reflected in the declining risk premium, but the dilemma is whether we should introduce the euro or invest in the areas I just highlighted,” he outlined.
One solution would be austerity, which liberal economists usually recommend. The other possibility is increasing investment in the mentioned sectors, which Pogátsa strongly supports, even if it means introducing the euro later.
He also pointed out that political changes have resulted in lower risk premiums. Hungarian long-term yields have moved closer to Polish and Czech yields.
“It is another question whether the government can maintain this trend. If yes, then lower yields will provide a source of revenue in the longer term and offer some fiscal room for maneuver. However, the benefits of lower yields will not appear immediately,” Pogátsa warned.
He concluded that if the government makes massive expenditures over the next few years, euro introduction will not happen quickly. If, on the other hand, it chooses austerity instead of investment, euro introduction will move even further away in time.
Fiscal Sovereignty Is Expensive
Gábor Regős, chief economist at Gránit Fund Management Ltd., pointed out that before 2010 there was always a target date for euro introduction, but because the conditions were never fulfilled, the date was always postponed, and after 2010 the euro was still not introduced even when fulfilling the conditions would have made it possible.
The Maastricht criteria mean price stability, orderly public finances, and exchange-rate stability—but these are necessary not only because of the euro, but also in Hungary’s own interest.
“The current budget deficit cannot continue. We need stricter fiscal policy for euro introduction, and it would send a very positive signal to the markets if we started moving in this direction. Introducing the euro also means giving up part of our sovereignty, but from a fiscal perspective we pay a lot for sovereignty. What happens if we do not introduce the euro?” Regős asked.
He pointed out that in recent years we have experienced a lack of confidence in the forint.
“The euro is introducing itself: tractors, houses, and many other things are already paid for in euros.”
Export companies receive their revenues in euros and only pay wages in forints. Ten years from now we will be paying with euros even if officially we still have the forint.
Maintaining the forint is expensive for the government because of higher interest rates; companies suffer from exchange-rate risk, while for households the forint is a source of inflation, he explained.
A Political Project
According to Stanislav Jansky, representative of the Czech organization Patrimonium Sancti Adalberti, it is important to keep in mind that introducing the euro was a political project rather than an economic necessity.
The idea was that the euro would connect the EU more strongly. However, if we look at the current geopolitical situation, the unipolar world has ended and today the world is multipolar.
“The EU faces economic difficulties, and Eastern Europe mainly exports to Western Europe. Until recently Slovakia was the largest country in our region that introduced the euro. Poland performs well economically but does not have the euro, and it will continue developing without it. Is there any eurozone country in the region that could serve as a model? Furthermore, are we certain that the EU will even still exist in five years?” Stanislav Jansky asked.
He concluded that we must be cautious regarding euro introduction because there is no reason to rush into something political in nature whose future is highly uncertain.
The Importance of Economic Convergence
During the debate following the opening presentations, Balázs Jávor, analyst at Oeconomus, explained that introducing the euro results in economic stability and cheaper financing in exchange for giving up monetary autonomy.
However, the long-term success of countries planning to introduce the euro depends not only on fulfilling the Maastricht criteria but also greatly on proper timing and deep structural adjustments.
He warned that in order for the advantages to outweigh the disadvantages, a country must achieve close synchronization with eurozone economic cycles before introducing the euro, and must also achieve significant productivity convergence, because afterward competitiveness can no longer be improved through a weak currency.
Using Eurostat data, the analyst examined the relationship between productivity convergence and eurozone accession.
Focusing on the six Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU at the same time as Hungary, he found that Lithuania’s productivity growth slowed significantly after introducing the euro, Poland achieved substantial convergence while retaining its own currency, and Slovenia achieved the smallest degree of convergence despite joining the eurozone already in 2007.
Balázs Jávor concluded that ultimately a country should introduce the euro only if economic convergence with the eurozone core countries has already been achieved.
Additional Economic, Corporate, and Geopolitical Perspectives
A representative of a foreign company operating in the automotive industry explained that at their company—as with almost every foreign company—accounting is conducted in euros because only euros appear on the revenue side.
Labor costs are in forints, which creates currency risk and administrative burdens. Consequently, introducing the euro would mean less risk and less administration for foreign companies.
One economist argued that the euro does not solve countries’ problems. For example, inflation rates in the Baltic countries reached double digits in 2022.
This happened because the eurozone is “unfinished” rather than a completed system. A few years ago such issues were debated within the EU, but today they are no longer.
Another problem highlighted by the participant was the declining competitiveness of the eurozone.
If the eurozone were to collapse, it would also have negative consequences for Hungary regardless of whether Hungary had introduced the euro or not.
Another participant approached the issue from a geopolitical perspective.
As he explained, the rapidly and significantly changing world order, characterized by competition between China and the United States, theoretically argues in favor of a stronger EU and euro.
The future is uncertain globally, but also within Europe, which for various reasons is falling behind China and the United States.
The EU faces pressure both from outside and from within to become more unified and stronger, while at the same time opposite tendencies can also be observed due to unsuccessful handling of crises within the EU.
In this situation, we will sooner gain a clearer understanding of where the EU is heading than the Hungarian government will be forced to make a final decision on introducing the euro.
