The energy front in the Russian-Ukrainian war is becoming increasingly critical: in recent weeks, there have been at least seven attacks on Ukraine’s natural gas production facilities, which have also disrupted the country’s gas supply. Ukraine is increasingly compensating for the shortfall with imports, and Hungary plays a key role in this. Nearly half of Ukraine’s gas imports currently comes from Hungary, which is redrawing the map of energy dependence in the region.
Background to the Russian attacks
The fact that energy is also being targeted in the Russian-Ukrainian war is not a new phenomenon. Russia has been regularly attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure since 2022, while Ukraine has also been trying to disrupt Russia’s oil supply with drone strikes since 2024. Before 2025, Russian strikes mainly targeted western Ukraine, especially gas storage facilities in Lviv province, where European traders previously stored significant amounts of natural gas, around 10 billion cubic metres. After Ukraine stopped the transit of Russian gas through the Brotherhood pipeline in early 2025, Russia intensified its attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Foreign companies and traders almost completely withdrew from these storage facilities, which are now used overwhelmingly by Ukrainian state-owned and domestic companies.
The figure can be referenced here: https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27507438/
The current attacks have had an even greater impact on Ukrainian natural gas production: drone and missile strikes simultaneously hit two eastern Ukrainian provinces (Kharkiv and Poltava), where production is most significant, causing a decline of nearly 60 per cent.
The Russians are also employing a new strategy. At the beginning of the year, the aim of the attacks was to inflict as widespread damage as possible, affecting several provinces and cities, thereby making the problem a national one. The current attacks, however, are much more concentrated. The Russians are now targeting specific local facilities, cities or districts, directing complex strikes at them using both drones and missiles.
The figure can be referenced here: https://www.datawrapper.de/_/th8lc/
As we discussed in detail in our previous analysis in April 2025, Ukraine has significant natural gas reserves and independent production capacity, which under normal circumstances can cover the country's annual consumption. However, the war and repeated attacks are causing constant disruptions: production is often interrupted, delaying the filling of storage facilities and increasing the country's dependence on imports. The current attacks have hit the infrastructure at a particularly critical time, just at the start of the heating season, when demand for gas is skyrocketing and the procurement period would have ended soon.
Hungary's role
Ukraine is trying to make up for the shortfall, which varies but is between 20 and 30 per cent, by importing from neighbouring countries. The main source is Hungary, but supplies from Poland are also crucial. The volume of natural gas arriving from Hungary has increased significantly in recent months and accounted for 46% of Ukrainian imports in 2025.
The figure can be referenced here: https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27507535/
The volume and proportion of natural gas coming from Hungary has been growing steadily since 2022. While Ukraine imported roughly 500 million cubic metres in 2022, which was about 2.5 per cent of gas consumption at the time, this figure had risen to 2.5 billion cubic metres in the first ten months of 2025. This represents approximately 14 per cent of Ukraine's gas consumption in 2025 and was expected to rise further by the end of that year.
The figure can be referenced here: https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27507638/
Natural gas exported to Ukraine does not originate from Hungarian production. Hungary acts as a transit country through which primarily European, but also Hungarian traders (e.g. MET Group) typically transport Russian – although not exclusively Russian – gas to Ukraine. This remains the most cost-effective route for Ukraine (the tariff is approximately €2.5-3/MWh), even though half of the imports, around 51%, are made under short-term capacity reservations, i.e. within the day and booked one day in advance. This is favourable for traders as it reduces risk, and while it is more expensive for Ukraine as short-term tariffs are higher, it is still worthwhile. For this reason, Hungarian transit has become strategically important.
Interestingly, some of the gas flows from Hungary not only to Ukraine, but also to Moldova and from there to Transnistria. Not all of the gas goes directly to Moldova: some of it is stored in Ukrainian storage facilities and only later withdrawn or exported when needed. Although the exact amount is unknown, since February 2025, when the agreement came into force, MET has transported at least 180 million cubic metres, but the actual volume is likely to be slightly higher. This amount covers approximately 10% of Transnistria's natural gas consumption.
Other routes, other difficulties
For Ukraine, the greatest opportunities for gas imports are at the Slovak border, with a daily capacity of 42 million cubic metres, which amounts to more than 1.2 billion cubic metres per month. The disadvantage, however, is that the tariff here is the highest, at around EUR 7 per megawatt hour. Hungary ranks second with a daily capacity of 9.75 million cubic metres, followed by Poland with 6 million cubic metres per day. Hungary is in a more favourable position in this respect, as its tariff is the same as that of Poland (between €2.5 and €3 per MWh), but its capacity is greater and it can import from more locations. Although the Slovak route has significant capacity, the price is almost three times higher than in Hungary.
In addition to Hungary, Poland also plays a key role in Ukraine's gas supply. Gas from Norway and the United States also reaches the country via this route through LNG terminals. American liquefied natural gas already accounts for nearly 10 per cent of Ukrainian imports, and its volume is expected to continue to grow in the near future. This is partly due to political considerations, as Ukraine is seeking to strengthen its relations with the United States and win Washington's support.
In addition, since the beginning of last summer, Ukraine has been attempting to revive a fourth route, the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline. Until 2020, this was one of the main routes for Russian gas to the Balkan Peninsula via Ukraine, Moldova and Romania, but it fell into disuse after the construction of the Turkish Stream. Now, however, the goal is for Ukraine to receive LNG through this pipeline. For the time being, however, there are financial constraints: the tariff is around €10 per megawatt hour, and the route is closer to the front line, so traders are reluctant to book capacity.
Although Ukraine has been holding auctions continuously in recent months, the Trans-Balkan route was only operational for two months: a total of 19 million cubic metres flowed through it between July and August 2025, followed by a further 3 million cubic metres in October, which is an insignificant amount. It then restarted in November 2025 after the Romanian and Moldovan parties offered Ukraine a 50 per cent discount between November 2025 and April 2026, but it is functioning at a low capacity due to a lack of orders.
In the Ukrainian energy sector, it is said, half-jokingly, that the Russian gas transit was a kind of guarantee for the country's uninterrupted natural gas supply, although this has little to do with reality. The Russians have regularly attacked Ukraine's energy infrastructure: if not always the gas network, then the electricity or oil industry facilities, the latter of which have been almost completely destroyed. All this poses a serious challenge for the Ukrainian state, as in addition to the damage caused by the war, the shortage of money is becoming increasingly critical, while Russian attacks continue to cause significant new expenditure in this area as well. It is therefore no surprise that the current winter is particularly difficult for Ukraine.
Anton Oleksiy is currently a Master's student in Political Science at the Faculty of Law and Political Science, Eötvös Loránd University. Previously, he worked as an intern at the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs, where he focused on the political situation in the post-Soviet space.
He specialises in international relations and diplomacy, in particular political and economic developments in the post-Soviet states.
