Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly suggested that Europe needs its own nuclear umbrella against Russia. The French president believes that France, the only nuclear power in the European Union, could play a key role in this. Now that Poland has once again declared its intention to deploy nuclear weapons on its territory, and some believe that it is questionable whether Donald Trump is willing to defend Europe, and the shadow of the Russian threat looms over the continent, the dilemma has been raised again: can someone replace the American umbrella?
French power
France launched its own nuclear weapons programme at the end of 1954. The first test was carried out in 1960, followed by more than 200 more until 1996, some in the deserts of Algeria and most in French Polynesia.
France now has the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world and the only one in the European Union. Its arsenal reached its peak at the end of the Cold War, when it had some 600 nuclear warheads. By now, half of this stockpile has been dismantled, and they currently have around 290 nuclear warheads, the vast majority of which are on active deployment.
French nuclear doctrine states that weapons serve a deterrent, defensive role. They can only be used in “extreme circumstances” when “vital interests of the country” are threatened. What exactly is meant by “vital interests” is, however, up to the interpretation of the president. Traditionally, it means a threat to the territorial integrity, sovereignty or population of the country. However, the question is whether these interests can extend beyond French borders, for example to allies.
The French nuclear arsenal is independent both technically and in its decision-making. This means that French nuclear warheads, launchers, aircraft and submarines are all French-made (unlike the UK, for example, which also relies on US equipment). The planning, the targeting, the exercises and, of course, ultimately the decision are all independent too. France is not even a member of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.
France’s nuclear force has two basic components.
Air force
Two Rafale squadrons of the French Air Force: 40 fourth generation fighter-bomber aircraft. These are capable of carrying nuclear payloads and can be equipped with the self-developed ASMPA cruise missiles. They have a range of up to 500 kilometres, but the Rafale can also be refuelled in the air, so the real range is much longer. They are currently based at three air bases: Saint-Dizier in the north-east, Istres in the south and Avord in the centre of the country.
In addition, the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle is also capable of carrying ten ASMPA-equipped Rafale aircraft. This does not mean that the ship carries nuclear weapons at all times, but they can be deployed quickly on presidential order if necessary.
Submarines
Another pillar of deterrence are the four Triomphant-class submarines. Each of these carries 16 M51 long-range ballistic missiles, with each missile (depending on the type) carrying roughly five to six individually targetable warheads. They have a range of 6,000-9,000 kilometres. For decades at least one of the four submarines has constantly been on patrol.
Land
Until 1996, land-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles were also in service, but these were dismantled after the break-up of the Soviet Union. This means that France did not consider it important to maintain the nuclear triad: i.e. the ability to strike from the ground, air and water.
Continuous development
Nevertheless, France is constantly modernising its arsenal. In 2018, Emmanuel Macron decided to invest €37 billion in the period 2019-2025 to maintain and develop France’s nuclear capabilities. The French defence budget allocates between €5 billion and €6 billion per year to this end.
There are ongoing plans for the gradual modernisation and replacement of all assets, with new submarines due to enter service by 2035 and the next versions of the M51 and ASMPA already under development, as well as the Rafale aircraft.
In the spirit of this strategy, the French President recently announced that Luxeuil-Saint-Sauveur, near the German border, will become the fourth air base for nuclear weapons. It is planned to station two Rafale F5 squadrons, currently under development, from 2035, equipped with the more advanced ASN4G launchers.
|
Weapon system |
Number of warheads | Range (km) |
Yield (kilotons) |
|
Aircraft from airbase: Rafale BF3/ASMPA |
40 |
2000 | 1<300 |
|
Aircraft from aircraft carrier: Rafale MF3/ASMPA |
10 |
2000 |
1<300 |
|
Submarine-launched ballistic missile: M51.1 and M51.2 |
80 + 160 |
6000+ and 9000+ |
4-6x 100 |
Can France defend Europe?
The idea that the French nuclear umbrella can be extended to allies is not a new one. French President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly suggested that the above-mentioned “vital interests” could be extended beyond the borders. This would not, of course, mean “more fingers on the button”, i.e. decision-making would remain in one hand. But it would obviously require the input and joint strategic planning of other states. The crucial question – which previously led Paris to decide to develop its own nuclear force – is whether, if an ally is attacked, the French are prepared to retaliate, risking being immediately targeted? The problem is this:
It is not clear how this is different from the NATO umbrella, of which the French are not members.
It seems that the principle of US “nuclear sharing” would not be applied, i.e. French nuclear weapons would not be stationed abroad. This would severely limit the power of deterrence.
The French nuclear arsenal is substantial, but not comparable to the Russian or American arsenal.
France does not have tactical nuclear weapons in the traditional sense. These are low-yield explosive charges designed for use in combat. This is a problem because they would be unable to respond in a proportionate way. For example, how would they respond if an enemy launched a limited tactical strike on an ally on the front line?
Foreign policy expert, journalist, press officer. He was a foreign policy journalist and editor for fourteen years, mainly at Magyar Nemzet. He specializes in the Middle East and North Africa. As a journalist, he has visited several countries and conflict zones in the region. He has reported from Israel and Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, but he has also visited Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabak, and Cyprus.
